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PARTICULAR CONTRACTS
J. Denson Smith*
Only a few significant cases within this classification were
decided during the last term. Most of them are in the process
of being noted in this Review. They include United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Dixie Parking Service, Inc.,' in
which the court considered the responsibility of a compensated
depositary with respect to property left in an automobile ac-
cepted for storage in a parking garage; Media Production Con-
sultants, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, Inc.,2 an inter-
esting and important case concerned with the right of a purchaser
of a foreign-built car from a local dealer to recover against the
American distributor; Fraser v. Ameling,8 which dealt with the
obligation of the purchaser of a home to discover the full extent
of termite damage where there is some known evidence of
infestation; and Gist v. Donaldson Ford Co., 4 which involved a
delicate question concerning the formation of a contract between
an automobile dealer and a prospective purchaser.
In addition to the mentioned cases, an interesting problem
of subrogation was presented in the case of Jacobs v. Sikes.5 It
appears that a brother, in pursuit of his own convenience, un-
known to his sister, transferred to her by way of a simulated
cash sale a certain tract of land. After learning of this, the
sister, in a letter to her brother, agreed to transfer the property
back to him when he was "ready." Subsequently she refused
to do this, apparently on the theory that she had paid for the
property. In support of this position she relied on a claim that
she had paid certain taxes on the property and also the fact
that she had paid off a mortgage amounting to about $2,000.
The majority of the court, with one judge dissenting, held that
the letter written by the sister to her brother constituted a
counter letter which established that the sale was a simulation,
and that the subsequent payments made by her would not change
this fact. To the contention that the sister was entitled to legal
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 262 La. 45, 262 So.2d 365 (1972).
2. 260 La. 80, 262 So.2d 877 (1972).
3. 259 So.2d 95 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972).
4. 262 So.2d 145 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
5. 253 So.2d 112 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1971).
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subrogation by virtue of paying off the mortgage, the court
refused to apply Civil Code article 2161.2 on the ground that,
since no "consideration" had been given for the transfer, the
sister was not a purchaser and was not entitled to legal sub-
rogation. Pretermitting the effect to be given to the sister's letter,
it does appear that she was either entitled to legal subrogation
on the ground stated by the dissenting judge, i.e., that having
paid taxes on the property she was a creditor when she paid
off the mortgage and was, therefore, entitled to legal subroga-
tion under article 2161.1, or that, in any event, she was entitled
to recover the amount she had paid in satisfaction of her brother's
debt. It is clear that a mere volunteer no way concerned in a
debt cannot, by paying it, become legally subrogated0 Granting
that the sister was a person no way concerned in the debt
(a question not free from doubt) and, therefore, not entitled
to legal subrogation, it appears, nevertheless, that the payments
made by her were not made by way of gratuity to her brother.
If it be granted that she considered herself as paying her
brother's debt, then she should have been entitled to recover
on the theory of negotiorum gestio, which is the underlying basis
for the remedy given by the second paragraph of Civil Code
article 2134.7 If she counted herself as paying her brother's
debt in the mistaken belief that she was indebted to him for
the property, Civil Code article 2310 would afford a remedy.
Finally, if neither negotiorum gestio nor the payment of a thing
not due could be properly applied, the action de in rem verso,
based on unjustified enrichment, would appear to have been
available to prevent the correlative impoverishment of the sister
and the enrichment of the brother. However, the opinion does
not make clear just what relief, other than through legal sub-
rogation, the sister was seeking as an alternative to being
recognized as owner of the property.
6. LA. Crv. CoDs arts. 2134, 2161.
7. See LA. Civ. Cone art. 2299; Standard Motor Car Co. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 97 So.2d 435 (La. App. let Cir. 1957), and the French
authorities therein quoted; also 2 CARBONNER, DRorr CIVIL, I 211(A)(a): "The
payment for another may proceed from a liberal intention and amount
to an indirect donation (the payer then has no recourse against the debtor).
But it may constitute simply a gestion d'affaire if the payer, although
rendering service to the debtor, does not intend to enrich him definitively
(in this case he has the right to be indemnified in accordance with Article
1375)."
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